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Selected Developments in California Law
Harbor v. Deukmejian: Expanding the
Item Veto to Nonappropriation Measures
Under the California Constitution, the governor may reduce or
disapprove sections of an appropriation bill, a power commonly known
as an "item veto."' In Harbor v. Deukmeian,2 the California Court
of Appeal for the First District expanded the Governor's power to
veto particular sections of a nonappropriation bill. The court ruled
that the Governor may item veto a section of a related nonappropria-
tion bill if that section is directly linked to a specified amount in
an appropriations measure.3 The court also held that the Governor
may item veto a portion of a nonappropriation bill to correspond
with a reduction in an appropriation bill.4 The Harbor court emphasiz-
ed that the legislature may not negate the Governor's item veto powers
by attempting to structure a veto-proof bill.5 Part I of this note sets
forth the facts and opinion of the Harbor case. Part II of this note
describes the legal background of the item veto in California. Part




On January 10, 1984, the governor submitted a budget for the
1984-1985 fiscal year to the legislature. After making various changes,
including the amendment subsequently at issue in Harbor, the
legislature presented to the Governor a budget bill that included a
lump sum appropriation of $1.5 billion for all Aid to Families with
1. CAL. CONsT. art IV, § 10(b). This section provides in part: "(b) The Governor may
reduce or eliminate one or more items of appropriation while approving other portions of a
bill .... .. Id.
2. 176 Cal. App. 3d 813, 222 Cal. Rptr. 382.
3. Id. at 819, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 819, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
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Dependant Children [hereinafter AFDC] payments.6 In a separate
budget implementation bill,7 the legislature amended Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 11056 to allow AFDC payments to begin on
the date of application, rather than when the recipient was determin-
ed to be eligible as existing law provided.' The Governor reduced the
lump sum appropriation by $9,776,000, the amount estimated in a
committee report as the increased cost of the attempted change by
the legislature of the date AFDC payments begin.9 The Governor also
exercised the item veto against the section of the budget implementa-
tion bill that would allow payments to begin when the application
is made.' 0 Petitioners, a group of welfare applicants and welfare rights
organizations, asked the court to order the State Department of Social
Services to comply with the changes made by the legislature, thereby
declaring the Governor's veto of a portion of the implementation bill
ineffective." The legislature filed a brief as amicus curiae in support
of petitioners.' 2
B. The Opinion
The issue of whether the Governor may veto a subject in a nonap-
6. Id. at 814-15, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
7. The budget implementation bill was designed to "provide necessary statutory adjustments
to implement the Budget Act of 1984." 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 268, § 71, at 139.
8. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. The proposed amendment
would change the date AFDC benefits began accruing. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11056.
9. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The Governor issued the
following statement accompanying the veto:
I am reducing this item by $9,776,000. This augmentation would have reversed cur-
rent State policy and regulations regarding the effective date of the first Aid to Families
with Dependent Chilren (AFDC) aid payment. Current law provides that the beginn-
ing date-of-aid for an AFDC recipient is the day of eligibility or the first of the
following month, but not later than 30 days from the date of application. The intent
of the AFDC program is to provide for cash assistance to meet current need. Since
no payment is made to an AFDC recipient until eligibility is determined, aid pay-
ment would not begin any sooner under the legislative proposal. However, in the
event an AFDC recipient has a demonstrated need, prior to authorization, the pro-
gram can provide for immediate need payments for eligibles before the date of
authorization.
1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 258, at 230. The Governor made a similar reduction in a separate item
to account for reduced federal support caused by the change in the beginning date of aid.
Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
10. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 815-16, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85. The Governor stated:
I am eliminating the adjustment relating to beginning date of aid for AFDC recipients.
I have reduced Budget Act Item 5180-101-001 by $9,776,000 and Budget Act Item
5180-101-866 by $10,385,000 to maintain current policies regarding effective date of
aid.. . . The elimination of this section . . . conforms to my actions on the budget.
1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 268, at 21.
11. Prior to the institution of this case, petitioners corresponded with the Director of the
Department of Social Services demanding implementation of Welfare and Institutions Code
section 11056 as amended. The Director refused. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 222 Cal.
Rptr. at 385.
12. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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propriation bill which corresponds to a reduction in a broader ap-
propriation bill was one of first impression before the court.' 3 The
issue turned on whether the veto fell within the powers given the Gover-
nor by article IV, section 10(b) of the California Constitution. Sec-
tion 10(b) states in part: "the Governor may reduce or eliminate one
or more items of appropriation while approving other portions of
a bill.''
Petitioners admitted that the Governor acted properly in reducing
the general appropriation in the budget bill under section 10(b).' 5 Peti-
tioners also admitted that the Governor could have vetoed the entire
implementation bill under section 10(a).' 6 The petitioners contended,
however, that the Governor's purported veto of the portion of the
budget implementation bill which changed the date AFDC benefits
begin accruing was not a complete veto under section 10(a), or an
item of appropriation under section 10(b). Therefore, the petitioners
argued, the Governor's actions were not within the veto powers granted
to the governor by the California Constitution.' 7
The Governor argued that the veto of a part of the budget im-
plementation bill was a proper item veto under section 10(b). The
Governor contended that finding the veto ineffective would upset the
system of checks and balances between the branches of government."
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the item veto would be reduced
because the legislature would be free to deliberately structure veto-
proof bills." Specifically, the Governor argued that the legislature
had merely separated the subject of the appropriation from the
amount, and the Governor had power to veto both portions of the
appropriation regardless of the form of the bills.2"
1. Majority
The Harbor court first referred to Wood v. Riley,2' which held
that an "item of appropriation" is a definite sum of money set forth
13. Id. at 817, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
14. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 10(b).
15. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
16. Id. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a). This section states in part: "(a) Each bill passed
by the Legislature shall be presented to the Governor. It becomes a statute if it is signed by
the Governor. The Governor may veto it by returning it with any objections to the house
of origin, which shall enter the objections in the journal and proceed to reconsider it .... Id.
17. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 816-17, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
18. Id. at 817, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 385. See generally infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
19. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 385. See generally infra notes
77-82 and accompanying text.
20. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 817-18, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
21. 192 Cal. 293, 219 P. 966 (1923).
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for a designated purpose.22 The Wood court also stated that an item
is composed of two parts, the subject and the amount." Relying on
Wood, the Harbor court rejected the argument of the petitioners that
the Governor's veto was ineffective merely because the subject and
amount of the purported veto were in two different bills. 2 The ma-
jority emphasized that the legislature could not override the Gover-
nor's item yeto by separating the amount from the subject and
demandinean all-or-nothing veto of the bill containing the statement
of subject. 25 The court held that if a specified appropriation is directly
linked to a particular subject, both amount and subject may be
eliminated by item veto.26
The court then addressed the more difficult question of whether
the Governor may exercise the item veto on a section of a nonap-
propriation measure 2 to correspond with a reduction of a lump sum
appropriation in an appropriations bill. 28 The Harbor majority held
that the Governor's veto of a portion of the budget implementation
bill was proper.2 9 The court found that the amount reduced by the
Governor corresponded directly to the amendment vetoed in the budget
implementation bill.3" In so holding, the court emphasized that the
22. Wood, 192 Cal. at 303, 219 P. at 971. The Wood court stated:
This court has held that "by specific appropriation" was understood "an Act by
which a named sum of money has been set apart in the treasury and devoted to
the payment of a particular claim or demand . . . The Fund upon which a warrant
must be drawn must be one the amount of which is designated by law, and therefore
capable of definitive exhaustion-a Fund in which an ascertained surm of money was
originally placed, and a portion of that sum being drawn an unexhausted balance
remains, which balance cannot be thereafter increased except by further legislative
appropriation."
Wood, 192 Cal. at 303, 219 P. at 971. See generally Note, 37 HARV. L. REV. 843, 844 (1937)
(item of appropriation is not susceptible to exact definition).
23. Wood, 192 Cal. at 304, 219 P. at 971. See also Commonwealth v. Barnett, 48 A.
976, 978 (Pa. 1901); Fairfield v. Foster, 214 P. 319, 322 (Ariz. 1923) (appropriations may
be divided into subject and amount).
24. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
25. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42 (dissent states the governor must choose
between passage or an all-or-nothing veto). See generally Daily Journal, Jan. 20, 1986, at 1,
col. 4 (legislature attempted to avoid the governor's veto by placing the amendment changing
the beginning date of AFDC payments in the budget implementation bill).
26. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. at 819, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387. This would occur, for example,
if the budget bill had specified $10 million to finance a change in the date aid begins to accrue.
The Governor could then eliminate both the funding and the beginning date amendment by
item veto. Id.
27. The nonappropriation measure in Harbor was the amendment placed in the budget
bill, which would change the date AFDC payments began accruing.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court conceded that they could find no precedent authorizing the Governor
to divide the lump sum appropriation into component parts and exercise the item veto to
eliminate corresponding subjects. Id.
30. Id.
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legislature left clear evidence of the cost of the adjustment to AFDC,
citing evidence of an Assembly-Senate Conference Committee report
that estimated the change in the beginning date of AFDC aid would
cost $9.8 million.31 The court also reiterated that the legislature may
not negate the governor's item veto power by placing the subject of
an appropriation in a nonappropriation bill.32 The majority concluded
that the budget bill and the budget implementation bill were "so in-
timately related" that the Governor's veto was an effective item veto.33
2. Dissent
The dissent in Harbor stressed that the Governor's power to item
veto under article IV, section 10(b) was more limited than suggested
by the majority.3" While the dissent agreed with the majority that
the Governor may veto a subject of appropriation contained in a
separate bill,35 the dissent rejected the majority position that the Gover-
nor may divide a lump sum into component parts and then eliminate
programs financed by the lump sum. 36 The dissent further criticized
the majority's reliance on the Committee report estimating the cost
of the change in the beginning date of aid to support their holding.37
The holding of the majority left open the question of whether the
Governor may veto substantive legislation only when the legislature
has left evidence of the cost of the legislation, or also when the Gover-
nor's staff is able to estimate the cost of the program. 38 The dissent
emphasized that the power to item veto should not depend upon the
ease of estimating the cost of component programs.39 Stating that
the majority's ruling was "unprecedented and unnecessary,"4 10 the dis-
sent argued that in situations where the legislature budgets by lump
sum appropriations, the Governor has only two options: reduce the
lump sum or choose an all-or-nothing veto of the corresponding bill.4'
The dissent felt that to hold otherwise would upset the balance of
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court did not address an argument by respondent that the Governor's veto
was an appropriate remedy for a violation by the legislature of the "one subject" rule. Id.
34. Id. at 820, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
35. Id. The dissent stated: "[The veto] may be used to reduce the amount of an appropria-
tion or to eliminate an item of appropriation and its corresponding subject matter (even if
the subject matter is contained in a separate bill, such as the budget implementation bill)." Id.
36. Id.
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power between the legislative and executive branches, and would create
the potential for direct legislation by the Governor. 2
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the past, the chief executive in many states could only approve
or disapprove a bill as a whole.43 The California Constitution gives
the Governor the power not only to veto any bill in the entirety but
also to partially veto portions of appropriations bills." California
adopted the item veto in 1908, and a 1922 amendment permitted the
Governor to reduce items as well as eliminate them.s Article IV, sec-
tion 10(b) of the California Constitution provides in part: "The Gover-
nor may reduce or eliminate one or more items of appropriation while
approving other portions of the bill.... "46 The purpose behind the
item veto was to enhance executive control of the budget., 7
The Governor's power to item veto appropriation measures was
initially interpreted in the leading case of Wood v. Riley.48 In Wood,
the legislature added a proviso to the budget bill submitted by the
Governor that provided one percent of money appropriated for various
educational purposes be set aside for the newly-created Department
of Education, which was not specifically included in the budget bill
when submitted by the Governor.4 9 The Governor vetoed this pro-
viso, and the Director of Education sought a writ of mandate, claim-
ing the veto was null because the proviso was not an "item of ap-
42. Id. The dissent said the majority holding created "precedent which gives the Governor
potentially limitless authority to use the line item veto to strike substantive programs." Id.
43. Note, 12 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 323 (1939). See also Comment, The Item Veto in the
American Constitutional System, 25 GEo. L.J. 106, 107-12 (1936); Note, 37 HARV. L. REv.
843, 844 (1937) (discussing the background of the item veto in the various states).
44. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
45. Note, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. 321, 323 (1939). See also Wood, 192 Cal. at 298-99, 219
P. at 969 (discussion of the 1922 amendment).
46. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(b).
47. Wood, 192 Cal. at 298-99, 219 P. at 969. The court stated:
By reason of the power of veto lodged in the Governor, the chief executive has always
had a most important relation to the legislative department, and, in so far as his
control over the expenditures of the state is concerned, the recent amendment to
the constitution providing for an "executive budget" . . . has tremendously widened
his powers, which was undoubtedly the primal object of the people in voting for
its adoption.
Wood, 192 Cal. at 298-99, 219 P. at 969. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 ("executive budget"
amendment). See generally Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 105 P. 593 (1909) (exercise of the
item veto prior to the 1922 amendment to the constitution).
48. 192 Cal. 293, 219 P. 966 (1923).
49. Id. at 294-97, 219 P. at 967-68.
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propriation." 0 The director contended the proviso was not an ap-
propriation because it merely provided for a transfer of funds.5" The
California Supreme Court held that the proviso was an item of ap-
propriation that could be vetoed by the Governor. 2 The Wood court
adopted the definition of "appropriation" provided in Stratton v.
Green," which held that an appropriation was a definite sum of money
set aside for a designated purpose connected with the state govern-
ment." The Wood court further recognized that every appropriation
involves considerations of both subject and amount.
55
The operation of the item veto was again addressed by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Reardon v. Riley.56 In Reardon, the legislature
submitted a budget bill that appropriated $1,625,185 for the depart-
ment of industrial relations and further provided that $328,000 and
$20,000 be expended by the department in a particular way." The
Governor eliminated the specific amounts, and also reduced the general
appropriation to $1,397,185.58 The defendant, arguing against the ef-
fectiveness of the veto, contended that the elimination of the $328,000
and $20,000 amounts automatically reduced the general appropria-
tion by a like amount, to $1,277,185. 5' Thus, the Governor's separate
reduction of the general sum to $1,397,185 resulted in an unauthor-
ized "increase" in the appropriation.6" The court rejected this argu-
ment and held that both the elimination of the specific amounts and
the reduction of the general sum were effective. 61 The Reardon court
held that the specific amounts were clearly "items of appropriation,"
as was the general appropriation.62 The Reardon court reasoned that
the legislature intended to appropriate the general amount regardless
of the fate of the specific appropriations. 63 The court further added
50. Id. at 297, 219 P. at 967-68.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 306, 219 P. at 972.
53. 45 Cal. 149 (1872) Stratton involved an application for a writ of mandamus to require
the Controller of State to draw a warrant in payment of a salary.
54. Stratton, 45 Cal. at 151. The Wood court stated that the proviso filled all the re-
quirements of a item of appropriation because it was a definite sum of money required for
a designated purpose. Wood, 192 Cal. at 304, 219 P. at 971. See supra, note 22.
55. Wood, 192 Cal. at 304, 219 P. at 971.
56. 10 Cal. 2d 531, 76 P.2d 101 (1938).
57. Id. at 533, 76 P.2d at 102.
58. Id. at 533-34, 76 P.2d at 102.
59. Id. at 535, 76 P.2d at 102-03.
60. Id. at 535-36, 76 P.2d at 102-03.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Reardon, 10 Cal. 2d at 536, 76 P.2d at 103-04. See generally Riley v. Johnson, 219
Cal. 513, 519, 27 P.2d 760, 762 (1933) (look to legislative intent in determining if appropria-
tion has been made).
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that such a holding would preserve the veto power of the governor
without affecting legislative intent.
6
4
The California Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Railroad
Commission v. Riley." In that case, the Governor eliminated $34,000
designated by the legislature for the safety section of the Railroad
Commission without reducing the total amount appropriated."6 The
court held the Governor could veto the specific appropriation without
affecting the amount of the general appropriation. 6' The Riley cases
established the scope of the Governor's power to reduce and eliminate
items in appropriations measures. 68 The Governor's power to use the
item veto to eliminate a portion of a nonappropriation measure had
not, prior to Harbor, been addressed by California courts.
III. LEGAL RAMIFCATIONS
Under the California Constitution, the Governor may reduce and
partially veto items in appropriation measures. 69 The holding in Har-
bor expands the Governor's power to exercise the line item veto. Under
Harbor, an "item of appropriation" may include a subject in a nonap-
propriation bill, if that subject can be directly linked to an appropria-
tion.7" The Harbor court felt that establishing the link between the
subject and amount presented little problem because of the necessary
relation between subject from amount.7'
Harbor also held that the Governor may item veto a portion of
a related nonbudget bill to correspond to a reduction in an appropria-
tion measure. 2 The majority indicated that the nonbudget bill should
64. Id. at 537, 76 P.2d at 103-04. See generally Board of Fish and Game Comm'n v.
Riley, 194 Cal. 37, 227 P. 775 (1924) (subsequent authorization from a special fund of an
expenditure greater than the specific budget appropriation did not encroach on legislative func-
tion because its effect is not to make an appropriation, but to render available an appropria-
tion already made).
65. 12 Cal. 2d 48, 82 P.2d 394 (1938).
66. Id. at 49-50, 82 P.2d at 395.
67. Id. at 53, 82 P.2d at 396-97.
68. See also Pomeroy v. Riley, 96 Cal. 355, 82 P.2d 697 (1938) (reaffirming Reardon and
Railroad Commission).
69. CAt. CONsT. art. IV, § 10.
70. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. See supra notes 24-26
and accompanying text.
71. Harbor, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court stated:
Actually, it would be difficult or impossible to completely separate amount from
subject. An amount without any label would be useless in the budget, and the label
itself is a statement of the subject. However, if a more detailed explanation were
contained in another bill, it should also be considered part of the appropriation for
purposes of the item veto.
Id.
72. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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be "intimately related" to the appropriation bill.73 Whether this "in-
timately related" requirement extends beyond budget implementation
bills is unclear. Furthermore, the legislature must apparently leave
"clear evidence" that links the item in the nonbudget bill with the
reduction in the appropriations measure.7" As the dissent pointed out,
determining when the evidence becomes "clear" may be pro-
blematical.7" The power to item veto a nonappropriation measure may
extend to situations when the legislature leaves "hints" of the cost
of a program, or also when the Governor's staff is able to estimate
the probable cost of a program.76
Finally, the Harbor court stressed that the governor must have the
power to perform the item veto when the legislature attempts to struc-
ture a veto-proof bill."' The dissent, on the other hand, argued that
the holding of the majority gives the Governor too much power, and
the Governor should be left with the choice of exercising an all-or-
nothing veto rather than an item veto." These two views exemplify
the traditional debate surrounding the proper role of the veto in the
separation of powers scheme.79 By exercising the veto, the Governor
is performing a legislative function.80 To prevent encroachment on
legislative intent, some authorities argue that the scope of the item
veto should be restricted.8 The competing argument contends that
the Governor's veto power should be broadly construed to effectuate
executive control of the budget" and to prevent logrolling and rider
tactics." The Harbor court clearly favors the latter policy.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 25 & 32 and accompanying text.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
79. See Comment, supra note 43, at 106-33. See generally Commonwealth v. Barnett, 48
A. at 976-78; Fairfield v. Foster, 214 P. at 320-21; Note, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. at 323 (1939);
Note, 37 H~Av. L. REV. at 844 (1937).
80. See Comment, supra note 43, at 121. See also Barnett, 48 A. at 976-77; Fairfield,
214 P. at 320-21.
81. See Comment, supra note 43, at 121-30.
82. See Wood, 192 Cal. at 305, 219 P. at 971 (legislature may not indirectly defeat the
purpose of the constitutional amendment giving the governor executive control of the budget).
See also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
83. See Barnett, 48 A. at 976-78. "Logrolling" refers to the practice of attaching subjects,
which would probably not pass as a separate bill, to desirable bills to ensure passage. "Riders"
are commonly known as new and unrelated enactments attached to appropriation measures.
See Barnett, 48 A. at 977. See also Comment, supra note 43, at 107-33.
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CONCLUSION
In Harbor v. Deukmejian, the California Court of Appeal for the
First District held that the Governor may veto the subject of an ap-
propriation even if that subject is contained in a nonappropriation
bill. The Governor may also item veto a portion of a related nonap-
propriation measure to correspond with a reduction in an appropria-
tions measure. The majority indicated that the nonappropriation bill
must be "intimately related" to the appropriation bill. Also, the sub-
ject of the appropriation must be directly linked to the dollar figure
in the appropriation bill, and the relation must be shown by clear
evidence. Finally, Harbor indicates that the Governor's veto power
must not be diminished by legislative attempts to circumvent the item
veto.
Lisa Kirk
